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INTRODUCTION
In 1967, the United States Supreme
Court handed down its watershed decision in
Katz v. United States,' establishing the principle
that the Fourth Amendment2 protects people
from government searches without a warrant in
places where a person has "exhibited an actu-
al (subjective) expectation of privacy," and that
expectation is "reasonable."' That same year,
researchers at the Advanced Research Projects
Agency met with representatives of the Depart-
ment of Defense to discuss possible computer
protocols that could be used to share data over
long-distance using computers.' Little did the
Justices in Katz know, these computer proto-
cols would soon revolutionize society's concept
of privacy as they developed into what is today
recognized as the Internet.
Every day, nearly three billion people
throughout the world connect to the Internet
to share and collect data.' In 2013, over 74% of
people in the United States used the Internet
in their household.I In addition, by 2014, 64% of
adults in the United States had a smartphone'
See generally Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347
(1967).
2 U.S. Const. amend. IV ("The right of the people to
be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated . . .
Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).




I The World in 2014: Facts: ICTFacts and Figures, Int'l
Telecomm. Union (May 5, 2014), http://wwwv.itu.int/
en/ITU-D/Statistics/Docunents/facts/ICTFactsFig-
ures20l4-e.pdf.
Thom File & Camille Ryan, Computer and Internet Use
in the United States: 2013, U.S. Census Bureau (Nov. 2014),
http://wwwcensus.gov/content/dani/Census/library/pub-
lications/2014/acs/acs-28.pdf.
8 Smariphone, Oxford Dictionaries, http://www oxford-
dictionaries.com/us/definition/american-english/smart-
phone (last visited Apr. 10, 2016) (defining smartphones
capable of accessing the Internet.' Explaining
the importance of using the Internet has be-
come a lesson in the obvious. While much of
the use of the Internet is innocuous, the Inter-
net is also commonly used for several insidi-
ous purposes, namely, for furthering crimes."
The Government has an interest in monitor-
ing these nefarious acts and, if needed, using
information gathered from this monitoring to
obtain an arrest warrant or to use as evidence
in a criminal trial."
Unique Fourth Amendment implica-
tions are raised when the Government wants
to monitor what persons do on the Internet be-
cause the Internet is not a tangible place that
can be observed using traditional police tactics,
but is instead a system of shared data that exists
in a complex system of servers, routers, and cli-
ent computers.'2 One of the key functions of the
Internet has been its ability to remember what
the user has previously done." Through the use
of "cookies" web browsers save the sites their
user visits: Gmail saves a record of the e-mails
users send," Facebook records when a person
as "a mobile phone that performs many of the functions
of a computer, typically having a touchscreen interface,
Internet access, and an operating system capable of
running downloaded applications.").
I Mobile Technology Fact Sheet, Pew Res. Ctc., http:!!
www.pewlnternet.org/fact-sheets/mobile-technolo-
gy-fact-sheet/ (last visited Apr. 10, 2016).
10 See Internet Crime Complaint Ctr, FBI 2013,2013
Internet Crime Report, Fed. Bureau of Investigation 14-16
(2014) http://wwwv.ic3.gov/media/annualreport/2013
IC3Report.pdf.
" See Michael O'Dwyer, The Next- Generation Tech Help-
ing the Police Fight Crime, Forbes (July 21, 2014), http://
www.forbes.com/sites/ptc/2014/07/21/the-next-gener-
ation-tech-helping-the -police-fight-crime/ (discussing
the use of computer technology in police work).
12 See infra Section I.C.
" See infra notes 119-122 and accompanying text.
" Google Terms ofService, Google, http://www.google.
com/intl/en/policies/terms/ (last visited Apr. 10, 2016).
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views a picture," Netflix can recommend shows
and movies based on what users have previous-
ly watched,"6 and the list goes on."
This information is collectively referred
to as "metadata" because it is data regard-
ing the data a user accesses on the Internet."8
While private companies normally store this
metadata, the National Security Administration
has recently been attempting to store metada-
ta of American Internet users." This storage of
computer metadata has drawn criticism from
privacy advocates and the public because of the
potentials for abuse.20
16 Facebook Data Use Policy: Cookies, Pixels and Other
Similar Technologies, Facebook, https://www.facebook.
com/about/privacy/cookies (last visited Apr. 10, 2016).
16 Netflix Privacy Policy, Nextflix, https://www.netflix.
com/PrivacyPolicy (last visited Apr. 10, 2016).
1 See infra Part I.C for a discussion on how these
technologies work.
18 The term "metadata" is also used to describe data
about use of a cellular phone. See infra Part I.C.
1 James Ball, VSA Stores Metadata ofMillions of Web
Users for up to a Year, Secret Files Show, Guardian, (Sept.
30, 2013 12:35 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/
world/2013/sep/30/nsa-americans -metadata-year- doc-
uments. See also Jewel v. NSA, No. 08-04373, 2015 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 16200 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 10, 2015) (dismissing
a case challenging the constitutionality of the NSA's
program).
20 Susan Page, Poll: Most Americans Now Oppose the
NSA Program, USA Today, (Jan. 20, 2014 3:io PM), http://
www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2014/01/20/
poll-nsa-surveillance/4638551 (showing polling on
an NSA program to store metadata). See also Carrie
Dann, Obama: Government Shouldn'tHold Metadata in
Bulk, NBC News, (Mar. 27, 2014, 9:14 AM), http://wwv.
nbenews.com/storyline/nsa- snooping/obama- govern-
ment-shouldnt-hold-metadata-bulk-n63651 (arguing
against the program); Bruce Schneider, Let the NSA
Keep Hold the Data: Giving it to Private Companies Will
Only Make Privacy Intrusion Worse, Slate, (Feb. 14, 2014,
3:03PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/fu-
ture tense/2014/02/nsa surveillance metadata the-gov-
ernmentnot-private-companies-should-store.html
(supporting the program over the alternatives of private
party storage).
This metadata is already stored en masse
by private companies.21 This storage is not out of
a benevolent desire to make using the Internet
convenient, but because this data is valuable to
advertisers who buy the metadata and use it to
make Internet advertisements more targeted
to the individual viewing the advertisement.22
While these advertisements can be distracting,
the general consensus among Internet users is
that targeted advertisements are an inevitable,
and perhaps even necessary, price for the use of
the Internet.23
The question thus arises as to whether
there is a reasonable expectation of privacy for
things people do on the Internet. People ac-
cept that advertisers may see what they look at
on the Internet, but they also do not generally
want individuals or the government monitoring
their whereabouts on the Internet.24 This di-
chotomy strains the traditional Katz analysis of
a reasonable expectation of privacy.25 This Note
attempts to alleviate that strain by reconceptu-
alizing a computer as a container and metadata
as information that is stored in that container.26
21 See infra notes 143-148 and accompanying text.
2 Ron Frankel, Why Metadata WillDefine the Fu-
ture ofTV, Mashable, (Aug. 8, 2011), http://mashable.
corm/2011/08/08/tv-everywhere-metadata (envisioning
the usefulness of metadata for television broadcaster
use online); Clint Pumphrey, How Do Advertisers Show
Me Custom Ads, HowStuffWorks, http://computer.how-
stuffworks.con/advertiser-custom-ads.htm (discussing
how the information is used to make targeted online
advertisement); Cotton Delo, Facebook to Use Web Brows-
ing Hitory for Ad Targeting, Adage (June 12, 2014), http://
adage.com/article/digital/facebook-web-browsing-his-
tory-ad-targeting/293656/ (discussing how Facebook in
specific will be using more metadata for more targeted
advertisements).
21 See Olivier Sylvain, Failing Expectations: Fourth
Amendment Doctrine in the Era ofTotal Surveillance, 49
Wake Forest L. Rev. 485, 490-91 (2014) (discussing that
advertisers will see individual's activities on the Inter-
net).
24 Id.
25 See infra Section II.D.
26 See infra Part IV.
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I I
By applying the Fourth Amendment protec-
tions for containers, the analysis for metadata
affords clear protections to computer metadata
from warrantless government searches.27
Part I of this Note discusses the back-
ground and development of Fourth Amend-
ment protection against warrantless searches
as well as the development of the Internet and
the use of metadata.2 1 Part II describes the cur-
rent circuit split and outlines the different ap-
plications of Fourth Amendment protections
to metadata and the Internet.29 Part III ana-
lyzes the split and the shortcomings of current
Fourth Amendment applications to metadata.o
Part IV proposes and discusses a new analytical
framework for Fourth Amendment application
by suggesting that computers are containers
and metadata is the content of that container."
I. TECHNOLOGY AND THE
FOURTH AMENDMENT
Before analyzing how the Fourth
Amendment protects computers, it is import-
ant to look at how Fourth Amendment protec-
tion against unreasonable searches has evolved
along with technology. First, it is important to
examine how the Supreme Court analysis of
the Fourth Amendment has evolved with tech-
nology.32 Second, it is important to examine
how Fourth Amendment protections extend to
unreasonable searches of containers." Final-
ly, a background on how the Internet works is
needed to understand current problems with
27 See infra Part IV
28 See infra Part I.
29 See infra Part II.
30 See infra Part III.
3t See infra Part IV
32 See infra Section I.A.
* See infra Section L.B.
applying the Fourth Amendment to current
technologies."
A. Reasonable Expectations of Privacy
and Warrantless Searches
The modern application of the Fourth
Amendment to warrantless searches began
with Katz v. United States." In Katz, the Su-
preme Court first acknowledged the Fourth
Amendment "protects people and not places. "36
Justice Harlan articulated the two-prong test
for when a search is unreasonable: "[F]irst, that
a person have exhibited an actual (subjective)
expectation of privacy and, second, that the ex-
pectation be one that society is prepared to rec-
ognize as 'reasonable."'3 7
The Katz doctrine has received criticism
for its lack of any bright-line rule, especially
when it is applied to new technology." Further,
courts seem to interpret the reasonable expec-
tation of privacy prong of Katz as based heavily
on property law.39 What the courts view as "rea-
sonable" is often at odds with what the legis-
lature or most people want to be considered
private.o
This reliance on principles of proper-
ty law for Fourth Amendment protection is
readily apparent in the majority opinion of the
3 See infra Section I.C.
5 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
36 Id. at 351.
Id at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring); see also United
States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 950 (2012) (noting that the
Supreme Court applied Justice Harlan's analysis from
Katz).
38 See Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New
Technologies: ConstitutionalMyths and the Case for Caution,
102 Mich. L. Rev. 801, 822 (2004) (calling the Katz doc-
trine a "Rorschach test" that "can support a narrow or
broad reading equally well"); Jed Rubenfield, The End of
Privacy, 61 Stan. L. Rev 101, 106 (2008) (calling the Katz
doctrine as "ineluctably circular").
39 Kerr, supra note 38, at 815-27.
40 Id. at 838.
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recent decision of United States v. Jones." The
majority relied heavily on the pre-Katz "physi-
cal intrusion" or "trespass" doctrine of Fourth
Amendment protection.2 In Jones, the Court
also acknowledged that Katz extended Fourth
Amendment protections beyond common-law
trespasses."3 One such extension exists for when
the government uses technology "not in gener-
al public use" in order to view a constitutionally
protected area that is not in plain view." These
protected areas are any area in which a person
has placed his or her effects and has "mani-
fested an expectation that the contents would
remain free from public examination."5 Pro-
tected areas are not static, but can move with
the person and remain protected because "the
Fourth Amendment protects people, not plac-
es." 6 One such protected area is in an opaque
container that a person controls."
41 132 S. Ct. 945 (20132012).
42 Id. at 949 ("The Government physically occupied
private property for the purpose of obtaining informa-
tion. We have no doubt that such a physical intrusion
would have been considered a'search' within the mean-
ing of the Fourth Amendment when it was adopted.").
See also, Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1413 (2013)
(holding that the use of a drug-sniffing dog within the
curtilage of the defendant's home without a warrant
was a physical intrusion and was unconstitutional).
Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 952. ("The Katz reasonable-expec-
tation-of-privacy test has added to, not substituted for, the
conimon-law trespassory test."). See also United States
v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 286 (1983) (Brennan, J., concur-
ring) (" [When the government does engage in physical
intrusion of a constitution ally protected area in order
to obtain information, that intrusion may constitute a
violation of the Fourth Amendment . . . .").
" Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 29-30, 40 (2001)
(noting the police used, without a warrant, a thermal
imager to detect infrared radiation emitting from heat
lamps used to grow marijuana inside the defendant's
house.
u United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 11 (1977).
6 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. at 351.
4 See generally Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1.
B. Reasonable Expectations of
Privacy and Containers
The general rule for searches under the
Fourth Amendment is that "in cases where the
securing of a warrant is reasonably practicable,
it must be used."8 The Supreme Court has rec-
ognized a general protection for objects a per-
son keeps within the curtilage of his or her own
property.4 9 This protection also extends to hotel
rooms5 0 and rental storage lockers that are kept
outside of the home." Unless the object is in
plain view from outside the curtilage, the object
is protected from warrantless police searches.52
Plain view does not necessarily equate to vis-
ibility with the naked eye, but to objects that
are visible using technology that is available for
"general public use.""
However, once a person leaves the cur-
tilage of her home, the objects she carries with
her do not necessarily receive the same protec-
tion as they would in the home.54 The reasoning
behind this distinction is that obtaining a war-
4 Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 1.32, 156 (1925).
9 Jardines, 133 S. Ct. at 1409.
5o Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483, 489 (1964).
"' See United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 721 n. 6
(1984) (noting that defendants "surely ... had a reason-
able expectation of privacy in their own storage lock-
er.").Butsee United States v. Lnu, 544 F.3d 361 (1st Cir.
2008) (holding that a defendant did not have a reason-
able expectation of privacy in a rented storage unit after
he failed to pay rent for several months).
52 Compare Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170 (1984)
(holding that police searching an open field is not an
unreasonable search), and California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S.
207 (1986) (holding that it was not unreasonable for
police officers to survey a house from aircraft over 500
feet above the defendant's house because they were in
"within public navigable airspace" and "from this point
they were able to observe plants readily discernible to
the naked eye as marijuana"), with Jardines, 133 S. Ct.
1409 (holding that a search was unreasonable when
evidence was found by a drug-sniffing dog while within
the defendant's curtilage without a warrant).
5 Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 28 (2001).
" See Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
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rant for searching a movable object is imprac-
tical.6 However, these objects are not without
protection." The Fourth Amendment generally
provides protection to the possessor of every
container that conceals its contents from plain
view because there is a reasonable expectation
of privacy of objects contained within opaque
containers." This protection from searches
only extends to the person who is the actual
controller of the container."
The first case to recognize Fourth
Amendment protection of containers outside
55 Id. at 154 ("[T]he guaranty of freedom from unrea-
sonable searches and seizures by the Fourth Amend-
ment has been construed, practically since the begin-
ning of the government, as recognizing a necessary
difference between a search of a store, dwelling house,
or other structure in respect of which a proper offi-
cial warrant readily may be obtained and a search of a
ship, motor boat, wagon, or automobile for contraband
goods, where it is not practicable to secure a warrant,
because the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the
locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be
sought.").
5 See United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 7 (1977),
abrogated by California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 580
(1991) ("The police may search an automobile and the
containers within it where they have probable cause to
believe contraband or evidence is contained"). See also
Bond v. United States, 529 U.S. 334 (2000) (holding that
the physical manipulation of a person's bag by a law
enforcement officer was an unreasonable search).
" Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420, 427 (1981) plu-
rality opinion) ("[U]nless the container is such that its
contents may be said to be in plain view, those contents
are fully protected by the Fourth Amendment."). But see
United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 824 (1982) (overrul-
ing Robbins in the context of searching an automobile
and holding that the scope of a warrantless search of an
automobile "is defined by the object of the search and
the places in which there is probable cause to believe
that [contraband] may be found."); Acevedo, at 580 ("The
police may search an automobile and the containers
within it where they have probable cause to believe
contraband or evidence is contained.").
8 Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128,155-56 (1978) (holding
that passengers do not have legitimate expectation of
privacy in the glove compartment or area under the
seat of a car in which they were merely passengers and
have no standing to challenge evidence found through
searching these areas).
the home was Ex Parte Jackson, which recog-
nized the Fourth Amendment protection from
warrantless searches of all containers delivered
in the mail.59 This long-standing precedent
bars the government from opening without
a warrant any sealed container that is sent in
the mail. 0 Even if the mail was delivered to the
wrong recipient, the protection from warrant-
less searches continues.61 However, if the pack-
age is damaged or opened by a third party so
that the contents are in plain view, the Fourth
Amendment protection dissipates.62
The Fourth Amendment has also gener-
ally extended to opaque, portable containers.3
The Court has defined a container as "any ob-
ject capable of holding another object." 4 For
example, in United States v. Chadwick, the de-
fendant was transporting a 200-pound foot-
locker when the police, suspecting it contained
marijuana, searched the container without a
warrant." The Supreme Court held this search
unconstitutional.6  The Court explained that
the defendant had the same reasonable expec-
5 96 U.S. 727, 733 (1877) ("The constitutional guaranty
of the right of the people to be secure in their papers
against unreasonable searches and seizures extends
to their papers, thus closed against inspection, wher-
ever they may be. Whilst in the mail, they can only be
opened and examined under like warrant, issued upon
similar oath or affirmation, particularly describing the
thing to be seized, as is required when papers are sub-
jected to search in one's own household.").
a Id. However, if the government does have a val-
id warrant, they may open the package searching for
contraband, then reseal it and deliver the package to its
intended recipient. Illinois v. Andreas, 463 U.S. 765, 771
(1983).
61 See Walter v. United States, 447 U.S. 649 (1980) (hold-
ing that the FBI cannot remove film from a container
without a warrant and view it when the package had
been delivered to the wrong person).
62 See United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109 (1984).
63 United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 (1977) abrogat-
ed by California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565 (1991).
" New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 461 n.4 (1981).
61 Chadwick, 433 U.S at 4.
6 Id. at 15-16.
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tation of privacy in placing items in a locked
footlocker as if he would have kept the items in
his home.67
The Fourth Amendment protection
similarly extends to unreasonable searches of
opaque lens containers," purses," filing cabi-
nets,70 and briefcases." No protection, however,
exists for containers that have a "single pur-
pose," such as a kit of burglar tools or a gun
case, which "by their very nature cannot sup-
port any reasonable expectation of privacy be-
cause their contents can be inferred from their
"712outward appearance.
Fourth Amendment protection from
warrantless searches extends beyond mere vi-
sual inspection of containers." In Bond v. Unit-
ed States, the Supreme Court examined a case
in which an officer examined the exterior of a
person's luggage by squeezing the outside of
the bag and noticing the contours of a "brick"
of amphetamines.4 The Court determined this
was an unconstitutional search,5 reasoning
67 Id. at 11 ("By placing personal effects inside a
double-locked footlocker, respondents manifested an
expectation that the contents would remain free from
public examination. No less than one who locks the
doors of his home against intruders, one who safe-
guards his personal possessions in this manner is due
the protection of the Fourth Amendment Warrant
Clause.").
6 United States v. Donnes, 947 F2d 1430, 1438 (10th
Cir. 1991.).
69 United States v. Monclavo-Cruz, 662 F.2d 1285, 1287
(9th Cir. 1981).
o O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709 (1987).
" United States v. Freire, 710 F.2d 1515, 1519 (11th Cir.
1983) ("Few places outside one's home justify a greater
expectation of privacy than does the briefcase.").
72 Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 764 n.13 (1979)
abrogated on other grounds by California v. Acevedo, 500
U.S. 565 (1991).But see United States v. Gust, 405 E3d
797 (9th Cir. 2005) (holding a gun case was a constitu-
tionally protected container because it was not readily
identifiable as a gun case).
" Bond v. United States, 529 U.S. 334 (2000).
1 Id. at 335.
5 Id. at 339.
that even though a person expects her luggage
will be touched and handled by other persons,
there is no reasonable expectation that the
container would be handled in an "exploratory
manner."76
However, there are several exceptions
to the warrant requirement." The number of
exceptions has grown so much that it has led
one Justice to comment that the warrant re-
quirement has "become so riddled with excep-
tions that it [is] basically unrecognizable."8 For
example, exceptions exist for searching closed
containers for when the container had been
thrown away," when searching containers "in-
cident to arrest,"80 when conducted during an
automobile search," when part of a border
search,82 when part of an administrative search
of regulated businesses," when there are exi-
gent circumstances for the search," when part
of an inventory search,5 when the search is of
children at school," and when the search was
conducted in objectively reasonable reliance
on binding appellate precedent." Even with so
many exceptions, any warrantless search can-
not extend in scope beyond what the officer
had probable cause to search.8
76 Id.
n See generally Craig M. Bradley, Two Models of the
Fourth Amendment, 83 Mich. L. Rev. 1468 (1985) (listing
exceptions to the Fourth Amendment).
7 Acevedo, 500 U.S. at 582-583 (Scalia, J., concurring).
* California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35 (1988).
80 Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969) (hold-
ing that police officers may search an arrestee's person
and area "within his immediate control").
81 United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 823-24 (1982).
82 United States v. Martinez-Fuente, 428 U.S. 543, 557-
59 (1976).
83 United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 31.1, 314-15 (1972).
Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452, 459-60. (2011).
85 Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640, 643-44 (1983).
86 New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 347 (1985).
Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229 (2011).
United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 825 (1982) ("The
scope of the warrantless search authorized by [an]
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Yet another, more far-reaching excep-
tion is the third-party doctrine.89 The doctrine
was first introduced to hold evidence that was
gathered by government informants whom the
defendant had confided in constitutionally ad-
missible, such as an associate who is wearing
a recording device9 0 or an undercover agent.91
The basic rationale was put forward in Katz
when the Court acknowledged that "[w]hat a
person knowingly exposes to the public, even
in his own home or office, is not a subject of
Fourth Amendment protection."92 This infor-
mation, while only revealed to one person, is
the same as revealing the information to the
public because the Fourth Amendment does
not protect "a wrongdoer's misplaced belief
that a person to whom he voluntarily confides
his wrong doing will not reveal it.""
The third-party doctrine extended be-
yond things confided to actual people to in-
clude records stored in the course of business,
such as bank records and automated tele-
phone pen registers.95 Pen registers are auto-
mated mechanical devices used by telephone
companies that recorded the numbers a per-
son dials on a telephone.96 Pen registers were
used by telephone companies for the purposes
exception is no broader and no narrower than a magis-
trate could legitimately authorize by warrant.").
89 See, e.g., Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 301-04
(1966); United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 748 (1971).
` Hoffa, 385 U.S. at 311.
01 Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206 (1966).
92 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967). See
also White, 401 U.S. 745, 748 (holding the third-party
doctrine to be constitutional post-Katz).
* Hoffa, 385 U.S. at 302.
* United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 453 (1976).
9 Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
96 Id. at 736 n. 1 (defining a pen register as "a me-
chanical device that records the numbers dialed on a
telephone by monitoring the electrical impulses caused
when the dial on the telephone is released. It does not
overhear oral communications and does not indicate
whether calls are actually completed.").
of checking billing operations, detecting fraud
and preventing violations of law.97
The Supreme Court in Smith v. Mary-
land reasoned that accessing these pen register
records without a warrant is reasonable since
there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in
the phone numbers dialed by a person.98 The
Court also noted that no property interest of
the defendant was violated since the pen reg-
isters were installed on the phone company's
property.99 While expanding the third-party
doctrine to automated pen registers, the Court
was cautious to point out the "limited capabil-
ities" of the pen register since pen registers do
not reveal any of the contents of the communi-
cation.100
While the third-party doctrine is still
controlling law, as technology advances, the
third-party doctrine has drawn heavy criti-
cism. 01 Several states' courts have backed away
from the third-party doctrine or outright aban-
doned it.102 In addition, one Justice of the Su-
9 United States v. N.Y Tel. Co., 434 U.S. 159, 174-75
(1977).
98 442 U.S. at 742.
9 Id. at 741.
10 Id. at 742.
'0 See generally, Sylvain, supra note 23 (arguing that the
third party exception offers little privacy protection for
many activities on the Internet); Stephen E. Henderson,
After United States v. Jones, After the Fourth Amendment
ThirdParty Doctrine, 14 N.C.J.L & Tech. 431 (2013)
(arguing that the Supreme Court may be shifting away
from the third-party exception); Stephen E. Henderson,
The Timely Demise of the Fourth Amendment Third Party
Doctrine, 96 Iowa L. Rev. Bull. 39 (2011) (arguing that the
third-party doctrine will soon be defunct).Butsee Orin
S. Kerr, The Case for the Third-Party Doctrine, 107 Mich.
L. Rev. 561 (2009) (arguing that the third-party excep-
tion is still viable).
102 Stephen E. Henderson, Learningfrom Ffty States:
How to Apply the Fourth Amendment and its State Ana-
logs to Protect Third Party Information from Unreasonable
Search, 55 Cath. U.L. Rev. 373, 376 (2006) (finding that
eleven states had rejected the federal third-party doc-
trine and ten more have possibly rejected it).
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preme Court has openly called into question
the validity of the third-party doctrine in the
digital age.10s This distaste for the third-party
doctrine likely draws heavily on the copious
amount of information people give out to third
parties online and how little of that informa-
tion they actually expect humans to access.104
C. The Internet and Metadata
To fully understand the intricacies of
privacy expectations in the digital era, it is im-
portant to take a step back and describe exact-
ly what the Internet is and how the computers
people use every day interact with the Internet.
According to the U.S. Census Bureau in 2014,
78.9% of all United States households have a
computer at home, with 94.8% of those homes
using their computer to connect to the Inter-
net.o0 In addition, 70.6% of individuals 25-34
years of age use smartphones.106 Smartphones
have become such a ubiquitous part of Amer-
103 United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 957 (2013) (So-
tomayor, J., concurring) ("[I1t may be necessary to recon-
sider the premise that an individual has no reasonable
expectation of privacy in information disclosed to third
parties .... This approach is ill suited to the digital age,
in which people reveal a great deal of information about
themselves to third parties in the course of carrying out
mundane tasks.").
IN Id. ("[Pleople reveal a great deal of information about
themselves to third parties in the course of carrying
out mundane tasks."). See also Sylvain, supra note 23
(stating that consumers are of two minds when it comes
to sharing information, one being that consumers are
subjectively concerned with privacy, the other that we
are willing to share personal information with Internet
service providers); Matthew Tokson, Automation and the
Fourth Amendment, 96 Iowa L. Rev. 581, 616-17 (2011)
(arguing that the third -party doctrine should apply if
the information is "observed" by an actual person, not
just an automated process).
1o5 United States Census Bureau, Computer & Inter-
net Trends in America, United States Census Bureau
(Oct. 28, 2014), http://-%wwcensus.gov/hhes/computer/
files/2012/ComputerUseInfographicFINAL.pdf.
10 Id.; Smartphone, supra note 8 (defining smartphones
as "a mobile phone that performs many of the functions
of a computer, typically having a touchscreen interface,
icans' daily lives that the Supreme Court has
noted "the proverbial visitor from Mars might
conclude they were an important feature of hu-
man anatomy."1 0 While the Internet is used at
a nearly universal level, how exactly it works is
rarely explained.
To begin, the Internet is not so much
a place as much as it is a thing. When two or
more computers are connected and share data,
they create a network or an "internet." 10s The
"Internet" is the name given to the large infra-
structure of these connections.109 This data and
information contained within the Internet is
most commonly found on the platform known
as the World Wide Web.110
There is also an important distinction
between the Internet and the way users access
the Internet." I Every computer that is connect-
ed to the Internet is part of a network that is
usually created and maintained by a private
company known as an Internet Service Pro-
vider or ISP who connects the computer's net-
work to the larger network of networks that is
the Internet.112 Every machine that connects to
the Internet has a unique identifying number,
called an Internet Protocol Address or an IP
Internet access, and an operating system capable of
running downloaded applications.").
1'0 Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2484 (2014).
1 In re DoubleClick Inc. Privacy Lit., 154 E Supp. 2d
497, 501 (S.D.N.Y 2001).
"0 Id ("The Internet is the physical infrastructure of
the online world: the servers, computers, fiber-optic ca-
bles and routers through which data is shared online.").
10 Id. ("The [World Wide) Web is data: a vast collection
of documents containing text, visual images, audio clips
and other information media that is accessed through
the Internet.").
n Id ("The Internet is the physical infrastructure of
the online world: the servers, computers, fiber-optic ca-
bles and routers through which data is shared online.").
12 Jeff Tyson, How Internet Infrastructure Works, How
Stuff Works, http://web.stanford.edu/class/msande91si/
wwyw-spr04/readings/weekl/Howstuffworks.htm. (last
visited Apr. 10, 2016).
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Address."'s This number is present regardless
of whether the computer is a "client" comput-
er, which requests data, or is a "server," which
provides data."'
These servers can take up a large phys-
ical space."' The reason for their colossal size
is due to the fact that the servers often need to
store an immense amount of data.116 This data
includes the content that is found on the In-
ternet, as well as data regarding the access to
that content."' This data regarding the access
to data is called "metadata."ns8
Metadata is often cumulated using a
computer program known as a "cookie," which
tracks an Internet user's actions." Popular
u1 Id
" Id. ("A server has a static IP address that does not
change very often. A home machine that is dialing up
through a modem, on the other hand, typically has an
IP address assigned by the ISP every time you dial in.
That IP address is unique for your session - it may be
different the next time you dial in. This way, an ISP
only needs one IP address for each modem it supports,
rather than one for each customer.").
115 See Mark Prigg, Inside the Internet: Google Allows First
Ever Look at the Eight Vast Data Centres That Power the
Online World, Daily Mail (Oct. 19, 2012 9:55 AM), http://
wwwy dailymail.co.uk/sciencetech/article-2219188/In-
side- Google-pictures-gives-look-8-vast-data-centres.
html. (noting that Google maintains hundreds of thou-
sands of servers, located in data centers ranging from a
warehouse in Iowa, a converted paper mill in Finland,
and other large spaces.).
"I Jeffrey Dean & Sanjay Ghemawat, MapReduce: Sim-
phifed Data Processing on Large Clusters, 51 Comms. ACM
113, 3 (2008) (stating in 2008, Google was processing
over twenty petabytes (a petabyte is 1000 terabytes or 10
bytes to the 15th power) of data per day).
11 See infra notes 143-148 and accompanying text.
11 Metadata, Oxford Dictionaries, http://wwwoxforddic-
tionaries.con/us/definition/american-english/metadata.
For examples of metadata, see, e.g., A Guardian Guide to
Your M1etadata, The Guardian, http://wvw.theguardian.
contechnology/interactive/2013/jun/12/what-is meta-
data-nsa- surveillance#meta= 1111111. (last visited Sept.
3, 2015) (Metadata is defined as "[a) set of data that de-
scribes and gives information about other data.").
11 Christina Tsuei, How Advertisers Use Internet Cookies
to Track You, Wall St. J., (July 30, 2010), http://wwwvwsj.
computer servers, such as Facebook and Goo-
gle, use these cookies to track their users' ac-
tions.120 By tracking a user's activities online,
companies are able to aggregate and sell the
metadata to advertisers,121 who are able to take
the metadata and target advertisements based
on what the individual user has been looking
at online.122 It is possible to access the Inter-
net without having some cookies tracking one's
movements by using a web browser's privacy
mode," or by using data encryption.124 Howev-
er, it is extremely difficult to eliminate all cook-




120 Facebook Data Use Policy, supra note 15; Google
Privacy Policy, Google, http://www.google.corn/intl/en/
policies/privacy/ (last visited Apr. 10, 2016) (describing
Google's uses of cookies).
121 Google Privacy Policy, supra note 120 ("[Google] may
share, non-personally identifiable information publicly
and with our partners - like publishers, advertisers or
connected sites. For example, we may share informa-
tion publicly to show trends about the general use of
our services.); Facebook Data Use Polig: Cookies, Pixels
and Other Similar Technologies, Facebook, https://wwnvw
facebook.com/about/privacy/cookies (last visited Apr. 10,
2016) ("[Facebook] may provide [advertising] partners
with information about the reach and effectiveness of
their advertising without providing information that
personally identifies you, or ifiwe have aggregated the
information so that it does not personally identify
you."); Netflix Privacy Polic, Netflix, https://Nw.netflix.
com/PrivacyPolicy (last visited Apr. 10, 2016) ( [Netflix]
may provide analysis of and information from or about
our users in the aggregate or otherwise in anonymous
form to partners, Service Providers and other third
parties.").
[22 Id.
123 Google Support Forum, Google, https://support.goo-
gle. coi/chrome/answer/95464?hl=en. (last visited Apr.
10, 2016) (For example, Google Chrome has an "incogni-
to mode." In this browser, Google will not save cookies,
however the information that is gathered by websites a
person accessed can still be saved by that server).
124 See Jeffrey Rosen, The Unwanted Gaze 173-78 (2000)
(discussing how encryption works and services that
provide online encryption).
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ies, and if cookies are disabled, many websites
will not function properly.12 5
Metadata from computers is similar to
the metadata that is stored by phone service
providers.126 The term metadata is used to refer
to both data regarding phone usage and data
regarding computer usage.127 While differenc-
es exist between the two, both fall within the
same federal statutory definition under the
Stored Communications Act (SCA).121 Meta-
data reveals similar information for both cell
phones and computer usage.129 For example,
metadata accrued when using e-mail services
will include the sender's and recipient's e-mail
addresses, the unique IP address of the send-
er, the date and time the e-mail was sent, and
whether the e-mail made it to the recipient.1s0
121 See Mozilla Support: Disable Third-party Cookies
in Firefox to Stop Some Types ofTracking byAdverti-
ers, Mozilla, https://support.mozilla.org/en-US/kb/
disable-third-party-cookies (last visited Apr. 10, 2016)
(stating that many e-mail services will not work without
third-party cookies).
126 Guardian, supra note 118.
127 Id.
128 See 18 U.S.C. § 2703(c)(A)(B) (2009) ("[a] govern-
mental entity may require a provider of electronic
communication service or remote computing service
to disclose a record or other information pertaining to a
subscriber to or customer of such service (not including
the contents of communications) only when the gov-
ernmental entity .. .obtains a warrant ... [or] obtains a
court order . . . ") (emphasis added). 18 U.S.C. § 2510(15)
(2015) (defining electronic communication services as
"any service which provides to users thereof the abili-
ty to send . . . electronic communications."); 18 U.S.C.
§ 2510(12) (2015) (defining electronic communication
as "any transfer of ... signals, . . . sounds, [or] data ...
of any nature transmitted in whole or in part by a wire,
radio, electromagnetic, photoelectronic or photooptical
system that affects interstate or foreign commerce.").").
See also United States v. Perrine, 518 E3d 1196, 1199-1201
(10th Cir. 2008) (stating computer metadata falls within
the Electronic Communications Privacy Act); In re Ap-
plication of the US. for Historical Cell Site Data, 724 E3d
600, 607 (5th Cir. 2013) (stating cell phone metadata falls
within the Stored Communications Act).
129 See supra note 126.
130 Id.
Metadata for search-engine queries includes
the search terms used, which web pages ap-
peared as a result, and which pages from those
results were accessed.' Telephone metadata
includes the phone numbers dialed, the loca-
tion in relation to a cell tower, duration of calls,
and in the case of smartphones, any computer
metadata it creates while using the Internet.13 2
While metadata may contain information that
may be individualized or personal to the user,
neither computer nor telephone metadata con-
tains any true "content" of messages.3
There is a paradox of how people ex-
pect privacy while using the Internet.' On
one hand, people would like to be, at least oc-
casionally, anonymous while on the Internet."'
In 2013, 86% of Internet users took steps to re-
main anonymous online, with 41% of users set-
ting their browser to disable or turn off cook-
ies.1 6 The data that Internet users felt was most
important to keep private was the content of
e-mail (83%).137 A majority of people also felt it
is important to keep private certain metadata,
such as the people they exchange e-mail with
(78%), the files you download (74%), websites
131 Id.
132 Id.
133 Barton Gellman, US. Surveillance Architecture In-
cludes Collection ofRevealing Internet, Phone Metadata,
Wash. Post, June 15, 2013, http://www.washingtonpost.
com/investigations/us -surveillance -architecture -in-
cludes -collection- of-revealing-Internet-phone-meta-
data/2013/06/15/e9bfOO4a-d511-11e2-bO5f-3ea3f~e7b-
b5a story.html. But see Matthew J. Tokson, The Content/
Envelope Distinction inInternetLaw, 50Wm. & Mary L.
Rev. 2105, 2123-31 (2009) (arguing that metadata can
reveal just as much as content).
13 Sylvan, supra note 23, at 493.
13 Lee Raine et al, Anonymity, Privacy, and Security
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you browse (69%), and the time of day you are
online (50%).138
On the other hand, a majority of people
(59%) do not believe it is possible to be com-
pletely anonymous online. 19 In addition, Inter-
net users appear to give up their reasonable ex-
pectation of privacy by accepting clickwrapped
contracts during the user's online use."o Ac-
cepting a contract is important for many courts'
analysis of whether any expectation of priva-
cy is reasonable."' Scholars have argued that
these contracts give away privacy rights with-
out the individual even knowing they are doing
it, because people "agree" to the terms of use
without reviewing them.42
For example, by using Google's services,
a person is agreeing to Google's "Terms of Ser-
vice," which allows them to collect the follow-
ing information:"' search queries, IP address-
es, cookies, actual location information (such
as GPS signals sent by a mobile device), and
personal information (such as names, e-mail
addresses, telephone numbers or credit card
information given to Google).1" Google also re-
serves the right to share information if it has
a good-faith belief the disclosure is reasonably
138 Id. This information falls within the definition of
metadata. See supra note 132.
13 Raine, et al., supra note 135.
14 Brandon Crowther, (Un)reasonable Expectation of
DigitalPrivacy, 2012 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 343, 353-54 (2012).
141 See, e.g., City of Ontario, Cal. v. Quon, 560 U.S. 746,
763-65 (2010) (determining that even if there is an
expectation of privacy in text messages, a contract
between the plaintiff and his governmental employer
made a search of plaintiffs cell phone reasonable); Unit-
edStates v. Simons, 206 F.3d 392 (4th Cir. 2000) (holding
that a remote search of defendant's work computer did
not violate the Fourth Amendment because of a con-
tract with the employer that allowed the employer to
audit his computer).
12 Crowther, supra note 140, at 354.
4 Google Terms ofService, Google, http://wwwgoogle.
com/intl/en/policies/terms/ (last visited Apr. 10, 2016).
("By using our Services, you agree that Google can use
such data in accordance with our privacy policies.").
"4 Google PrivacyPolicy, supra note 120.
necessary to "meet any applicable law, regula-
tion, legal process or enforceable government
request."4 5
One possible explanation for why peo-
ple simultaneously believe that they are reveal-
ing information while still keeping the infor-
mation private is because of the infinitesimal
likelihood that any actual person will see that
information.1 16 The processing and storage of
the vast amount of metadata is automated out
of efficiency."' For example, online bookstore
Amazon lists the "Automatic Information" that
it stores and the softvare it uses to gather and
analyze the metadata. "' It is the gathering and
aggregation of metadata that makes the Internet
possible."' However, to what extent metadata is
protected from government searches is a ques-
tion that has not yet been clearly answered.
145 Id.
"6 See Toksonssory test.rson of the use of their services
f privacy), , ,supra note 104, at 604-09.
142 Id. at 603 ("ISPs . . . automatically collect and pro-
cess enormous amounts of data about users' web-surf-
ing habits. ISPs maintain logs of the IP addresses of
each website a user visits as well as the volume of data
transmitted to and from the user. Some service provid-
ers even monitor and retain the address of each individ-
ual page a user visits. Many affiliated groups of websites
collect the URLs of each page a user sees within their
group. These service providers and website networks
then automatically use this information to target adver-
tisements to the individual user, or sell the information
to third-party advertisers for the same purpose.").




visited Apr. 10, 2016).
19 See Alon Even,By Data and MobileAnalytics: Ready
to Rule 2015, Venturebeat, (Jan. 22, 2015, 4:33 AM), http://
venturebeat.com/2015/01/22/big-data-and-mobile-an-
alytics-ready-to-rule-2015 (stating that the market for
analyzing metadata is expected to grow to $16.9 billion
in 2015).
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II. CURRENT PROTECTIONS FOR
COMPUTER DATA AND METADATA
With the rise of the Internet, comput-
ers and cell phones are becoming an important
part of everyday life.so The problem for courts
in analyzing Fourth Amendment protections is
that the use of these devices creates metada-
ta, which contains information that does not
fit neatly into any category of current Fourth
Amendment protections.151
Under the Stored Communications Act
(SCA), the government may obtain from In-
ternet Service Providers (JSPs) or telephone
companies any metadata of a user by obtain-
ing a court order.152 This court order does not
require a showing of probable cause, but only
a "specific and articulable showing that there
was reasonable grounds to believe that the
contents ... are relevant and material to an on-
going criminal investigation."
The Supreme Court has yet to address
the issue of whether warrantless searches of
metadata are constitutional.15 4 Without any
"50 See supra note 105.
151 SeeAmerican CivilLiberties Union o. Clapper, 785 F.3d
787, 821 (2d Cir. 2015) (stating that metadata "presents
potentially vexing [Fourth Amendment] issues.").
152 18 U.S.C. § 2 703(c) (2009) ("A governmental entity
may require a provider of electronic communication
service or remote computing service to disclose a re-
cord or other information pertaining to a subscriber to
or customer of such service (not including the contents
of communications) only when the governmental entity
... obtains a warrant ... [or] obtains a court order ...
Ms Id. § 2703(d). See In re Application ofthe U S. for
Historical Cell Site Data, 724 E3d 600 (5th Cir. 2013) (not-
ing this burden is less than that required for probable
cause).
"' See Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2489 n.1 (2014) (stating that
their ruling on searches incident to arrest of a defen-
dant's cell phone does "not implicate the question
whether the collection or inspection of aggregated
digital information amounts to a search under other
circumstances."). See also City of Ontario, Cal. v. Quon,
guidance from the Supreme Court, circuit
courts have diverged widely in the consti-
tutionality of searching either computer or
phone metadata without a warrant and relied
on a range of rationales." Cases discussing
telephone metadata provide a useful compari-
son for computer metadata, since both types of
metadata fall within the same federal statute.15 1
Circuits fall into three categories: (1) holding
warrantless inspections of data and metadata
under the SCA are unconstitutional because
there is a reasonable expectation of privacy in
that information;.5 . (2) holding warrantless in-
spections of metadata constitutional because
metadata falls under the third-party doctrine
or is analogous to a pen register;15 8 and (3) hold-
ing that warrantless inspection of metadata is
not per se unconstitutional, but that magistrate
judges have discretion to require a showing of
probable cause.159
A. Warrantless Searches under the Stored
Communications Act Are Unconstitutional
The first court to attack the constitution-
ality of warrantless searches under the SCA
was the Sixth Circuit in United States v. War-
shak.6 0 In Warshak, the government obtained
27,000 of the defendant's private e-mails from
his ISP without a warrant.161 The case did not
directly implicate Fourth Amendment protec-
tion of metadata, but the protection of contents
on the Internet, which in this case were the de-
560 U.S. 746, 746 (2010) (suggesting that a person might
have a reasonable expectation of privacy in data sent
from a cell phone).
15 See infra Part II.
156 18 U.S.C. § 2703(c). See also supra note 128.
1' See infra Section H.A.
158 Infra Section II.B.
1519 Infra Section II.C.
160 631 F3d 266 (6th Cir. 2010) (en banc).
161 Id. at 282.
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fendant's e-mail."6 2 The Sixth Circuit held that
there is a reasonable expectation of privacy in
e-mails because they are the digital equivalent
of letters."
In analyzing the relationship between
the ISP and e-mails, the court treated the ISP
not as a third party, but as an "intermediary"
that had the ability to access the data, but did
not diminish the reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy in that data. [64 The court concluded that
section 2703(d) of the SCA, allowing the gov-
ernment to obtain e-mails from ISPs without a
warrant, was unconstitutional.'1 5
In 2014, a panel from the Eleventh Cir-
cuit held unconstitutional the same provi-
sion of the SCA as applied to the warrantless
searches of cell phone metadata in the case of
United States v. Davis."' In Davis, the govern-
ment obtained information from the defen-
162 Id. at 288 ("The government may not compel a
commercial ISP to turn over the contents of a subscrib-
er's emails without first obtaining a warrant based on
probable cause." (emphasis added)).
1I Id. at 285-86 ("Given the fundamental similarities
between email and traditional forms of connunication,
it would defy common sense to afford emails lesser
Fourth Amendment protection.... Email is the techno-
logical scion of tangible mail, and it plays an indispens-
able part in the Information Age."). But see United States
v. Lifshitz, 369 E3d 173, 193 (2d Cir. 2004) (concluding
that the Fourth Amendment protects against searches
of a probationer's home computers and e-mails, but
that "the 'special needs' of the probation system are
sufficient to justify conditioning [defendant's] probation
upon his agreement o submit to computer monitor-
ing.").
Id. at 286-87. ("As an initial matter, it must be ob-
served that the mere ability of a third-party intermedi-
ary to access the contents of a communication cannot
be sufficient to extinguish a reasonable expectation of
privacy. . Similarly, the ability of a rogue mail handler
to rip open a letter does not make it unreasonable to as-
stune that sealed mail will remain private on its journey
across the country.").
166 Id. at 288.
* 754 E3d 1205, 1213, vacated, 573 Fed.Appx. 925 (11th
Cir. 2014) (mem.).
dant's cell-phone service provider that showed
the defendant had placed and received cell-
phone calls in close proximity to the locations
of the robberies for which he was charged."'
This cell site location information is a form of
telephony metadata.6 8 In striking down the
law, the Eleventh Circuit relied heavily on the
Supreme Court's decision in United States v.
Jones' and determined that tracking a per-
son's movements via cell phone was turning
a person's private whereabouts into a public
event.170 The Eleventh Circuit pointed out that
metadata regarding the location of a cell phone
did. not fall within the third-party exception."'
The court relied on reasoning from a case from
the Third Circuit that stated that a cell-phone
user is not voluntarily revealing her location to
the phone company, even when placing a call.172
Moreover, even if the user is willingly giving
metadata, the user is unaware the information
will be stored."'
This opinion was latervacated en bane."7
The en banc 11th Circuit determined that ob-
taining cell site location information from the
service provider without a warrant was not a vi-
olation of the Fourth Amendment because the
information was a "business record" similar to
the bank records from Miler or the pen reg-
167 Id. at 1209-10.
168 See supra note 127.
169 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012).
10 Davis, 754 E3d at 1216.
"I Id. at 1216-17.
172 Id. at 1217 ("[W]hen a cell phone user makes a call,
the only information that is voluntarily and knowingly
conveyed to the phone company is the number that
is dialed, and there is no indication to the user that
making that call will also locate the caller.") (quoting In
re Application of the U S. for an Order Directing a Provider
ofElec. Connc'n Serv. to Disclose Records to the Gov't, 620
E3d 304, 317 (3d Cir. 2010)).
17 Davis, 754 E3d at 1217.
1 UnitedStates v. Davis, 573 Fed.Appx. 925 (11th Cir.
2014) (men.).
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ister from Smith.? The majority emphasized
the importance that the metadata was a form
of "non-content evidence" created for use by
a third party."' However, this ruling only ap-
plied to cell site location metadata and no oth-
er forms of metadata. M
In dissent, two judges echoed the senti-
ments of the original panel's ruling and argued
the majority's reason could "allow the govern-
ment warrantless access to not only where we
are at any given time, but also to whom we send
e-mails, our search histories, our online dating
and shopping records, and by logical exten-
sion, our entire online personas."s The dissent
latched onto the ambiguous line between con-
tent and non-content evidence."
A divided Fourth Circuit, in a similar
case involving the warrantless obtaining of cell
phone metadata, disagreed with the en banc
Eleventh Circuit in United States v. Graham.8s
Relying on the Supreme Court's decisions from
Karo and Kyllo, the Eleventh Circuit held that
the warrantless obtaining of cell site location
information, a form of metadata, is unconstitu-
tional because it could "allow the government
to place an individual and her personal proper-
ty specifically, her cell phone-at the person's
home and other private locations at specific
points in time."' Furthermore, the court re-
lied concurrences of Riley and Jones, the Fourth
Circuit held that obtaining cell phone locations
1I United States v. Davis, 785 E3d 498, 511 (11th Cir.
2015) (en bane).
16 Id. at 511.
`7 Id. at 505 (calling the ruling "narrow").
's Id. at 533 (Martin, J., dissenting).
"' Id. at 537 (Martin, J., dissenting).Butsee, Orin S. Kerr,
Applying the Fourth Amendment o the Internet: A General
Approach, 62 Stan. L. Rev. 1005, 1019-20 (2010) (articu-
lating that the content/non-content distinction can be a
viable way to structure Fourth Amendnent protections).
180 796 F3d 322, 355-56 (4th Cir. 2015) cacated for re-
hearing en banc, 624 Fed. Appx. 75 (mem.).
I Id. at 346.
was the form of long term tracking and drag-
net-style surveillance of a person's movements
that is an unreasonable search.'82
B. Metadata Under the Third-Party
Doctrine and Pen Registers
The Fourth Circuit's decision in Graham
contrasts with an earlier Fourth Circuit deci-
sion in an unpublished opinion from 2000 that
held there is no reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy of any information, including metadata,
shared with Internet service providers."' While
not explicitly reciting the third-party excep-
tion, the court pointed to a lack of a reasonable
expectation of privacy because the defendant
"entered into an agreement o obtain Internet
access from [his ISP and] he knowingly re-
vealed his name, address, credit card number,
and telephone number to [the ISP] and its em-
ployees.""8
In 2001, the Sixth Circuit echoed this
sentiment and determined that computer us-
ers do not have a reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy in metadata relating to "their subscriber
information because they have conveyed it to
another person-the system operator.""s This
subscriber information was metadata that in-
cluded the names, addresses, birthdates, and
passwords of subscribers to an online bulletin
board." The court equated subscriber infor-
182 Id. at 347-49.
18 United States v. Hambrick, 225 E3d 656 (4th Cir.2000),
affg United States v. Hambrick, 55 ESupp. 2d 504, 508-
09 (W.D. Va. 1999).
* Hambrick, 55 E Supp. 2d at 508.
185 Guest v. Leis, 255 E3d 325, 335 (6th Cir. 2001).
186 Id. This subscriber information is similar to infor-
mation Google gathers from its users, which Google
will only share with the user's consent or if they have
a "good-faith belief that .. .disclosure of the informa-
tion is reasonably necessary to ... meet any applicable
law, regulation, legal process or enforceable governmen-
tal request." Google Privacy Policy, supra note 120.
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mation to bank records and pointed to the Su-
preme Court ruling that there is no reasonable
expectation of privacy in bank records."' By
2010, the Sixth Circuit formed a distinction be-
tween metadata regarding subscriber informa-
tion from the metadata created when sending
e-mails.88
The Ninth Circuit in 2007 addressed
the warrantless inspections of metadata and
found them to be functionally equivalent to
pen registers." The court looked in particular
at metadata displaying the "to/from addresses
of [defendant's] e-mail messages, the Internet
protocol ("IP") addresses of the websites that
he visited[,] and the total volume of informa-
tion transmitted to or from his account."190 The
court equated the surveillance of this metadata
to surveillance of the physical mail."' The court
treated e-mail as contents of mail and all the
18 Id. (citing United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976)).
'" United States v. Warshak, 631 E3d 266, 286 (6th Cir.
2010) (en banc) ("[T]he mere ability of a third-party
intermediary to access the contents of communication
cannot be sufficient to extinguish a reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy."). See also Warshak v. United States 490
F.3d 455, 472 (6th Cir. 2007) ("Guest [v Leis] did not hold
that the mere use of an intermediary such as an ISP to
send or receive e-mails amounted to a waiver of a legiti-
mate expectation of privacy,").
19 United States v. Forrester, 512 E3d 500, 510 (9th Cir.
2007) ("We conclude that the surveillance techniques
[that reveal the to/from addresses of e-mail messag-
es, the IP addresses of websites visited and the total
amount of data transmitted to or from an account] are
constitutionally indistinguishable from the use of a pen
register that the Court approved in Smith." (referring to
Smith o. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979) (holding pen reg-
isters constitutional)); But see In re Application ofthe U S.
for an Order Authorizing the Use of a Pen Begister & Trap
on {xxx] Internet Serv. Account/User Name {xxxxxxx@
xxx.comj, 396 F.Supp.2d 45 (D. Mass. 2005) (holding that
a pen register cannot extend to content).
'90 Id at 504. This information falls within the definition
of metadata. Supra note 127.
191 Id. at 511 ("The government's surveillance of e-mail
addresses . . . may be technologically sophisticated, but
it is conceptually indistinguishable from government
surveillance of physical mail.").
metadata as information transmitted to a third
party, the ISP, similar to the address on the out-
side of a package.192
The Tenth Circuit joined in a similar line
of reasoning when looking at whether there is
a reasonable expectation of privacy in Internet
subscriber information.'1 In that case, Penn-
sylvania law enforcement obtained, via court
order, the subscriber information from Yahoo!,
from which they were able to determine each
day in which the defendant had logged into his
account from his home computer.194 The court
determined there was no reasonable expec-
tation of privacy in subscription information
because it had been revealed to a third party;
namely the ISP.195 Similar to all the circuits in
this category, the Tenth Circuit relied on the
third-party doctrine and found no reasonable
expectation of privacy in metadata.96
C. Magistrate Judge Discretion
The Third Circuit currently stands alone
in determining that it is in the discretion of the
magistrate judges, who grant the court order
compelling metadata from a cell phone service
or ISP, as to whether probable cause is neces-
192 Id ("E-mail, like physical mail, has an outside ad-
dress 'visible' to the third-party carriers that transmit it
to its intended location, and also a package of content
that the sender presumes will be read only by the in-
tended recipient .... The contents may deserve Fourth
Aiendment protection, but the address and size of the
package do not."). But see Kerr, supra note 179, 1017-19
(arguing to replace this type of distinction).
1"3 United States v. Perrine, 518 F.3d 1196, 1204-05 (10th
Cir. 2008) (citing cases).
194 Id. at 1199.
'9 Id at 1204-05. The court also pointed out that the
defendant had peer-to-peer software on his computer
which allowed other computers access to files on his
computer which "additionally vitiates any expectation of
privacy he might have in his computer and its con-
tents." Id
I % Id
20 Washington College of Law Spring 2016
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sary to obtain the metadata.'97 The court point-
ed out that the government did not seek the
contents of any electronic communication, but
metadata regarding the cell site location."' The
court nonetheless deferred to the magistrate
judge's ruling that cell phone metadata could
be the functional equivalent of a tracking de-
vice, which would require a showing of prob-
able cause.19 The court relied heavily on the
legislative history of the SCA in giving discre-
tion to magistrate judges on whether probable
cause should be required to compel a company
to provide the government with a customer's
metadata.2 00
The concurrence added an alternative
reasoning for why a magistrate judge could
turn down a court order compelling disclosing
metadata.2 01 The concurrence reasoned that us-
ing cell-phone metadata could allow the gov-
ernment to track a user's location within his
home and that doing so without a warrant would
" In re Application ofthe U S. for an Order Directing a
Provider ofElect. Commc'n Sero. to Disclose Records to the
Gov't, 620 F.3d 304, 319 (3d Cir. 2010) ("Because (SCA §
2703) as presently written gives the [magistrate judge]
the option to require a warrant showing probable cause,
we are unwilling to remove that option . . . .").
198 Id at 306 ("The Government does not .. . seek dis-
closure of the contents of wire or electronic communi-
cations. Instead, the Government seeks what is referred
to in the statute as 'a record or other information per-
taining to a subscriber to or customer of such service' . .
Id. at 310-11 ("The [magistrate judge] held that..
. the government must show probable cause because
a cell phone ... cell phone location information ...
make[s] a cell phone act like a tracking device.").
200 Id. at 313-14.
201 Id. at 320 (Tashima, J., concurrence) ("[T]he mag-
istrate may refuse to issue [a court order compelling
metadata disclosure] only if she finds that the gov-
ernment failed to present specific and articulable
facts sufficient to meet the standard under [28 U.S.C]
§ 2703(d) or, alternatively, finds that the order would
violate the Fourth Amendment absent a showing of
probable cause because it allows police access to infor-
mation which reveals a cell phone user's location within
the interior or curtilage of his home.").
be an unreasonable search.202 The current cir-
cuit split as to whether the Fourth Amendment
protects metadata shows the need for a unified
analytical framework for distinguishing when
there is a reasonable expectation of privacy in
metadata.203 Some circuits hold that an ISP's or
cell phone service provider's ability to access a
user's metadata is enough, under the third-par-
ty doctrine, to defeat a reasonable expectation
of privacy.20 4 Others circuits hold that access
alone is not enough to view metadata without a
warrant,205 or at least not enough to view meta-
data that shows the location of an individual.20
The main source of conflict comes from when a
defendant's expectation of privacy can be con-
sidered "reasonable."207
III. SHORTCOMINGS OF CURRENT
PROTECTIONS OF METADATA
Scholars have argued that the Katz test
of a "reasonable expectation of privacy" will
progressively get less workable as technolo-
gy progresses since the courts lack the intri-
cate knowledge of new technologies and the
third-party doctrine will put the court in a dif-
ficult position.208 This position appears to be
closing in when applying Katz and the reason-
able expectation of privacy to computer and
202 Id. (citing Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 35-36
(2001)).
203 See Sylvain, supra note 23, at 523 (concluding that
the "Fourth Amendment doctrine today has nothing to
offer in the way of privacy protection when even courts
are imcertain about how to define public expectation as
a descriptive matter.").
204 Supra Section II.B. See also, United States v. Davis, 785
F.3d 498 (11th Cir. 2015) (en banc) (holding similarly).
205 Supra Section II.A.
206 Supra Section II.C.
207 See generally Sylvain, supra note 23 (discussing the
failure to establish a clear reasonable expectation of
privacy in a digital context).
208 Crowther, supra note 140.
Washington College of Law 21Spring 2016
17
Michels: What's In The Box? Re-Conceptualizing Computers as Containers, Me
Published by Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law, 2015
4 1
cell phone metadata.209 All three categories of
courts tend to have the same flaw; namely, they
all lack a clear conception of what metadata has
a reasonable expectation of privacy and what
does not.21 o
The first group of circuits"' only ad-
dressed a narrow category of metadata. The
Sixth Circuit in Warshak dealt with the ac-
quiring of only the content of e-mail.212 The
court left open the possibility that non-content
metadata, such as IP addresses, subject lines
of e-mails, and other forms of metadata do not
get protection.213 The Fourth Circuit in Graham
did draw a distinction between information
that was voluntarily conveyed to a third par-
ty and metadata that was not.214 However, the
case dealt only with cell site information, leav-
ing questions about computer metadata unan-
swered.215 Similarly, the panel in the Eleventh
Circuit in Davis dealt only with cell phone lo-
cation.2 16 If the rationales regarding telephone
metadata from the Fourth Circuit and the panel
from the Eleventh Circuit extend to computer
metadata, it could support Fourth Amendment
209 See generally Sylvain, supra note 23.
210 See Crowther, supra note 140, at 358-63 (providing
examples of "where the traditional reasonable expec-
tation of privacy standard has failed in digital contexts
and where the courts have yet to clearly define bound-
aries.").
211 Supra Section IIA.
212 United States o. Warshak, 631 E3d 266, 286-87 (6th
Cir. 2010) (en banc).
213 Id at 288. ("[A] subscriber enjoys a reasonable
expectation of privacy in the contents of emails." (em-
phasis added)). See also Kerr, supra note 179, at 1019-31
(arguing that content of Internet communications is
protected by the Fourth Amendment but non-content
metadata is not).
211 United States v. Graham, 796 E3d 332, 376-77 (4th Cir.
2015).
215 Id. See also United States v. Bynum, 604 E3d 161,
162-63 (4th Cir. 2010) (holding there was no unreason-
able search when police acquired a defendant's Yahoo!
account information without a warrant).
216 See United States v. Davis, 754 E3d 1205, 1208 (11th
Cir. 2014).
protection for metadata that reveals a user's lo-
cation or that is automatically generated, such
as a person's IP address.217
The first category of circuits also tends to
gloss over the third-party doctrine in its analy-
sis. 21 The Sixth Circuit does attempt to vitiate
the applicability of the third-party doctrine by
referring to an e-mail server as an "intermedi-
ary" and not a third party.219 Similarly, the Fifth
Circuit treats cell phone companies as interme-
diaries who are entrusted with users' location
information that is not intended "to be open to
inspection of others."220 The Eleventh Circuit
panel in Davis addressed the third-party doc-
trine in the context of cell-phone location and
determined that a cell-phone company was not
a third party because the only metadata that a
person voluntarily shares with a phone com-
pany "is the number that is dialed."22 Neither
the Eleventh Circuit panel nor the Fifth Circuit
address what would happen to the reasonable
expectation of privacy if access to a person's lo-
cation, via GPS location, becomes part of the
217 Graham, 796 E3d at 358 ("Like a user of web-based
email who intends to maintain the privacy of her mes-
sages, however, there is nothing the typical cell phone
user can do to hide information about her location from
her service provider."). See also Tokson, supra note 133,
at 2131-36 (arguing that search terms and IP addresses
are content similar to e-mails).
218 Warshak, 631 E3d at 287 ("WlVe recognize that our
conclusion may be attacked in light of the Supreme
Court's decision in United States v. Miller . .. ."); United
States v. Graham, 796 E3d 332, at 378. (Motz, J., dissent-
ing) (arguing that the third party doctrine should apply
to metadata).
219 Warshak, 631 F3d at 287. See also Patricia L. Bellia &
Susan Freiwald, Fourth Amendment Protection for Stored
E-Mail, 2008 U. Chi. Legal F 121 (arguing that ISPs are
not third parties under existing precedent).
220 Graham, 796 E3d at 358.
221 Davis v. United States, 754 E3d 1205, 1217 vacated 573
Fed.Appx. 925 (11th Cir. 2014) (mem.).
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contract for using a cell phone or Internet ser-
vice.222
The rationales of the second group of
circuits2 rely heavily on cases from the 1970s,
namelyMiller"' and Smith.2 2 These courts seem
to commit the folly of "contend[ing] that the
degree of privacy secured to citizens by the
Fourth Amendment has been entirely unaf-
fected by the advance of technology."226 While
the information was gathered from individuals'
home computers, none of the circuits discuss
the technology's "general public use" require-
ment set forth in Kyllo for when viewing inside
a person's curtilage.22 Some scholars have ar-
gued that these circuits' rationales are drawn
from judges' relative lack of experience in the
context of swiftly evolving digital technolo-
gies.28
222 See Crowther, supra note 140, at 353-55 (arguing that
contracts greatly affects the reasonable expectation of
privacy). For an example of a contract that has a clause
allowing for tracking GPS location, see GooglePrivacy
Policy, supra note 120 ("When you use a location-en-
abled Google service, we may collect and process
information about your actual location, like GPS signals
sent by a mobile device."). See also, City of Ontario, Cal. v.
Quon, 560 U.S. 746 (2010) (holding that an employment
contract affects the reasonable expectation of privacy in
messages sent from a work pager).
223 Supra Section II.B.
224 United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976).
22 Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
226 Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 33 (2001).
227 See, e.g., United States c. Perrine, 518 E3d 1196 (10th
Cir. 2008) (stating that the police were able to track the
sending of illegal content sent from defendant's com-
puter to inside his house).
228 Kerr, supra note 38, at 875-76 ("Judges struggle to
understand even the basic facts of [digital] technologies,
and often must rely on the crutch of questionable met-
aphors to aid their comprehension."); Crowther, supra
note 142, at 356 ("[H]ow can a judge with no technolog-
ical background grasp the intricacies of an IP address
that allows substantial tracking of individuals online,
and at the same time gauge how much privacy society
feels it is giving up by going online?").
Additionally, the rationales of courts
in the second category seem to strain the
third-party doctrine to a great extent.229 Many
activities done on the Internet are not know-
ingly exposed to the public or confided to third
parties since these third parties are not per-
sons, but automated machines.23 0 Treating these
automated machines as functionally equivalent
to pen registers looks past critical dicta from
Smith where the Court acknowledges the "lim-
ited capabilities" of the pen register,3 which
points out that pen registers were not even ca-
pable of indicating if the call was even complet-
ed.232 Metadata reveals far more information
than a pen register could reveal.233
The rationale of the third group23 4 strikes
a middle ground between the first and second
groups. By giving deference to magistrate judg-
es, the court some shows flexibility in deter-
mining which metadata is protected and which
is not.2 The problem with this deference is
that this will lead to inconsistent rulings on the
same types of metadata based on which magis-
trate judge is making the ruling.236 Additionally,
the reasoning that allows magistrate judge dis-
cretion in requiring a heightened showing of
probable cause may not be on firm statutory
grounds."
229 See Tokson, supra note 104, at 588-601.
230 Id.
231 Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S 735, 742 (1979).
232 Id. at 736 n. 1.
3 See supra note 130-132 and accompanying text.
2 Supra Section II.C.
235 Id.
236 See Kerr, supra note 179, at 1029 (stating every Inter-
net application generates its own data and the line be-
tween protected data and non-protected data is difficult
to establish.").
232 See In re Application of the U S. for Historical Cell Site
Data, 724 E3d 600, 606-07 (5th Cir. 2013) (arguing that
the Third Circuit's analysis allowing discretion ignores
the intervening "shall" in 28 U.S.C. § 2703(d)).
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With a circuit split on whether there is
a reasonable expectation of privacy in metada-
ta, a simplified analytical framework is needed
to determine when metadata is protected from
search. As the use of computers becomes more
prevalent,238 it becomes imperative to create es-
tablished protections for metadata.23 9 The next
Part seeks to establish this framework.40
IW. CONTAINER LAW AND METADATA
Courts should consider computers as a
container, treat all metadata as contents stored
within computers, and apply the same Fourth
Amendment protections for metadata as for
other contents of containers. By treating com-
puters as containers, a person's reasonable ex-
pectation of privacy in metadata is shaped by
how they use ISPs and a clear line is estab-
lished between what metadata is protected and
what metadata is not. Courts can address com-
puters kept within the home and computers
used outside the home, i.e. smartphones, and
applying container law, find identical Fourth
Amendment protections for metadata.
A. Computers and Smartphones as Containers
The Supreme Court defines a contain-
er as "any object capable of holding another
object"41 and both computers and phones fit
squarely within the definition of an opaque con-
tainer.2 42 Both are portable and could potential-
ly contain objects that a person wishes to keep
from public view. The Supreme Court has al-
ready recognized that modern cell phones are a
container that hold a person's "privacies of life"
238 File, supra note 7.
239 See Sylvain, supra note 23, at 523.
240 See Part IV
241 New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 461 n.4 (1981).
242 A computer is defined as an "electronic device that
can store, retrieve, and process data" Merriam Webster
Collegiate Dictionary 256 (11th ed. 2006).
and deserves Fourth Amendment protection.2 43
Computers follow similarly since they contain
vast amounts of information and smartphones
are already considered "minicomputers."244
Furthermore, computers are implicitly
referred to as containers in the Stored Com-
munications Act.245 Section 2703(b) requires
disclosure of contents of electronic commu-
nication that are "held or maintained" by a
provider of "remote computer service."246 Par
(c) of that section applies to the disclosure of
"other information pertaining to a subscriber
or customer of such service" that the computer
service provider maintains.247 Both the contents
of electronic communications and information
are stored by ISPs in massive computer serv-
ers. 248 While their contents are electronic data
and are not physically tangible, the Supreme
Court has recognized that data is still an ob-
ject that can be contained in a computer or cell
phone.249 Since computers and cell phones are
containers, all of their contents should receive
similar protection.
B. Metadata as Contents
Computers contain not only data, but
also metadata.250 Scholars have articulated
there is a distinction between metadata that
is "content" and metadata which in non-con-
243 Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2495 (2014).
244 Id. at 2489.
245 See supra note 128.
246 28 U.S.C. § 2703(b)(2) (2009). The term "remote com-
puter service" is defined as "the provision to the public
of computer storage or processing services by means
of an electronic communications system[.]" 18 U.S.C. §
2711(2) (2009).
247 28 U.S.C. § 2703(c).
248 See supra notes 115-118 and accompanying text.
249 See, e.g., Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2485 (applying Fourth
Amendment protection to data on cell phones).
250 See supra notes 117-118 and text accompanying.
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tent "transactional data.""' However, the line
between metadata that could be considered
content and metadata that could be considered
transactional is blurred and difficult to find.252
IP addresses and search queries are metadata
that fall around the hazy line.253 By treating all
metadata as contents of a computer similar to
data, the analysis avoids finding this difficult
distinction and recognizes that metadata is
contained the same as data.254
1. Internet Servers as Rented Space
Treating metadata as contents in a con-
tainer then moves the analysis of whether there
is a reasonable expectation of privacy to who
has a possessory interest in the container so that
it has protection from unreasonable search-
es.255 The easy answer would be the ISP who
owns the server.256 Yet that ISP did not create
251 See, Tokson, supra note 133, at 2123-26 (arguing the
distinction of information as either content or non-con-
tent is "perhaps the most important determinant of
the constitutional and statutory protection which that
information receives."); Kerr, supra note 192, at 1019-
22 (formulating a distinction between content and
non-content metadata); Susan W Brenner & Leo L.
Clarke, Fourth Amendment Protection for Shared Privacy
Rights in Stored Transactional Data, 14 J.L. & Pol'y 211,
279-80 (2006) (arguing that transaction data should be
constitutionally protected).
252 See Kerr, supra note 192, at 1029-30 ("Every different
Internet application generates its own data, and lines
must be drawn to distinguish content from non-content
for each. Some cases are difficult").
2 Tokson, supra note 133, at 2109-10.
254 See id, at 2126-32 (stating that e-mails and the
transmission of website data are sent using "packets of
digitalized information" which includes content as well
as metadata). But see Kerr, supra note 192, at 1021-22 (ar-
guing the "fact that content and non-content informa-
tion are actually jumbled together as packets shouldn't
matter").
255 See Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 148 (1978) (a pos-
sessory interest is required for a reasonable expectation
of privacy).
256 See, e.g., Brian I. Simon, The Tangled Web We Weave:
The Internet and Standing Under the Fourth Amendment,
21 Nova L. Rev. 941, 968 (1997) (arguing only system
the metadata and has no interest in any partic-
ular metadata created by any one individual.257
The ISP's interest is in aggregating the meta-
data and selling it to advertisers.258 Often, larger
Internet companies will remove any metadata
that could be used to identify a particularized
individual.259
A possessory interest is shared between
the ISP and the creator of the metadata, the
user of the computer.260 This makes the storage
of th.e metadata akin to a rental storage unit.2 61
The user allows, consciously or not, their meta-
data to be stored within third-party servers, via
third-party cookies, in order to use the Inter-
net effectively.262 In exchange for the use of the
storage, the user agrees, via contract, to allow
the ISP to sell its aggregated metadata.263 Part
of this agreement is the understanding that the
operators, and not users, have standing to challenge
searches).
257 Neil M. Richards & Jonathan H. King, Big Data Eth-
ics, 49 Wake Forest L. Rev. 393, 417 (2014) (stating that
it is illegal for ISPs to sell their customer's identifying
information or data, but that metadata "can be aggre-
gated with other information to reveal as much or more
about individuals as personally identifying information
or actual data").
258 See Sylvain, supra note 23, at 490-91 (Internet com-
panies "see personal user data as the currency of the
networked information economy. For them, it is to be
'reused, repurposed and sold to other companies' for
secondary uses that no one really anticipated when the
data were first collected" (footnotes omitted)).
259 For example, see supra note 121.
260 Brenner, supra note 251, at 274-76 (noting that a
consumer has a shared privacy interest in metadata).
See also United States v. Warshak, 631 F3d 266, 286 (6th
Cir. 2010) (stating that ISPs are only an "intermediary"
which make Internet conmmunications possible).
261 See Bellia &Freiwald, supra note 219, at 165-66 (par-
alleling ISPs with rental storage and arguing that "one
does not engage the third party because one wants the
intermediary to have access . . . she engages with the
ISP out of the desire to use its intermediary services.").
262 See supra note 125 (stating many Internet programs,
such as e-mailing platforms, do not function without
allowing third-party cookies).
263 See Google Privacy Policy, supra note 120.
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user's metadata is handled by automated ma-
chines and the user's activities on the Internet
will not be viewed by a person who could iden-
tify the user.264
Treating the servers as rental storage is
similar to the Sixth Circuit's reasoning that
an e-mail service provider is an "intermedi-
ary" and avoids implicating the third-party
doctrine in establishing Fourth Amendment
protection.265 This reasoning could be expand-
ed to protect all Internet services and not just
e-mail.266 E-mails are easy to conceptualize as
sending data and content since they are similar
to ordinary mail. 26' However, using any Inter-
net service is a similar sending and receiving
of data.268 For example, typing in a search query
on Google is sending data from the user, i.e.,
the requested search terms.269 Google's server
receives the data and then sends data, i.e., the
search results, and links to other web pages
back to the user.270 Google's servers then store
all the metadata.271
26 See supra notes 146-148.
265 United States v. Warshak, 631 E3d 266, 286-87 (6th
Cir. 2010) (en banc). See alo Bellia & Freiwald, supra
note 219 (stating ISPs are not third parties).
266 See, e.g., Tokson, supra note 133, at 2131-32 (arguing
that all Internet communication is similar to sending an
e-mail).
267 Id. at 286. (referring to e-mail as the "technological
scion of tangible mail").
268 See Tyson, supra note 112. ("All of the machines on
the Internet are either servers or clients. . . . When you
connect to [a website] to read a page, you are a user
sitting at a client's machine. You are accessing the [web-
site's] server. The server machine finds the page you
requested and sends it to you.").
269 See Tokson, supra note 133, at 2134 (referring to
search queries as "content" which receives Fourth
Amendment protection); See also In re Application ofthe
U S. ofAmerica for an OrderAuthorizing the Use ofa Pen
Register and Trap on [xxx] Internet Service Account/User
Name [xxxxxxxx@xxx.com, 396 E Supp.2d 45, 49-50 (D.
Mass. 2005) (excluding from a warrant all metadata that
contains search queries).
270 Tyson, supra note 112.
271 See supra note 116.
Computer servers are far different than
the third parties that were originally envisioned
by the Court in Katz. 27 2 The Court in Katz ex-
cluded from protection what persons "know-
ingly expose[]s to the public" 273 and things
shared with an individual 27 4 or even a machine,
such as a pen register.275 The Supreme Court
was cautious to point out these limited capa-
bilities of the pen register.276 While a computer
server is an automated machine and has been
equated to a pen register by some courts,277 a
computer server reveals far more information
than a pen register.278 Because of the similari-
ties between computers and other containers,
the Fourth Amendment protections of contain-
ers should be instructive on how metadata is
protected from unreasonable searches.
2. Container Law and Personal Computers.
Using metadata created from this ex-
change of data, ISPs and advertisers can fol-
low the user's activities online.279 By accessing
metadata from these companies, the govern-
ment could also see a person's movements on-
line by seeing what websites a person accessed,
when she accessed those websites, who she
e-mailed, and other information gathered by
272 Crowther, supra note 140, at 366 ("The third party
doctrine was established prior to the digital age, and its
advocates could not have fully contemplated society's
heavy reliance on digitally stored information."). See also
United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 957 (2012) (Soto-
mayor, J., concurring) (arguing that the Court should
reconsider the third-party doctrine because it "is ill
suited to the digital age, in which people reveal a great
deal of information about themselves to third parties in
the course of carrying out mundane tasks").
273 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).
274 Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 302 (1966).
275 Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
276 Id. at 742.
277 E.g., United States v. Forrester, 512 E3d 500, 510 (9th
Cir. 2007).
278 See supra notes 129-133.
279 See supra note 22.
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third-party cookies.28 0 The Supreme Court has
been wary of letting the government track the
activities of a person without a warrant, espe-
cially when those movements are within a per-
son's home.281 The activities of a person online
should be even more protected when the use
of the Internet is within the curtilage of the
home, which about 75% of Americans have a
computer at home that they uses to connect to
the Internet.2 8 2 By allowing the government to
view metadata of a computer, it would allow the
government to peer within the curtilage and
see what a person is doing within the privacy of
his or her home.283 By examining metadata, the
government is in essence viewing a container
within the home, something that already has a
reasonable expectation of privacy.284
A warrantless search can also be seen
as a trespass onto a person's curtilage.2" Even
280 See supra notes 119-125 and accompanying text.
281 See, e.g., United States v Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 957
(Alito, J., concurring) (finding that using a GPS tracker
on defendant's vehicle without a warrant for four weeks
was an unreasonable search); United States v. Karo, 468
U.S. 705 (1984) (holding that tracking to the inside of a
defendant's house was an unreasonable search).
282 File, supra note 105.
283 Compare United States P. Perrine, 518 E3d 1196,
1199-1200 (2008) (upholding the constitutionality of
using a court order to obtain metadata that disclosed
the dates defendant had logged onto a Yahoo! accont
from his house), vith United States v. Karo, 468 U.S.
705, 715 (1984) (excluding evidence gathered when
"the Government surreptitiously employs an electron-
ic device to obtain information that it could not have
obtained by observation from outside the curtilage of
the house."). See also In re Application ofthe U S. for an
Order Directing a Provider ofElect. Commic'n Service to
Disclose Records to the Gov't, 620 E3d 304, 320 (3d Cir.
2010) (Tashima, J., concurring) (holding that telephony
metadata is protected because it allows the police to see
a user's location within the curtilage of their home).
2" See Karo, 468 U.S. 705.
285 Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 952 (majority opinion of Scalia, J.)
(holding that for Fourth Amendment protection from
unreasonable searches, the reasonable expectation of
privacy test has been "added to, not substituted for, the
common-law trespassory test."); Id. at 955 (Sotomayor,
without a physical entering of land, the gov-
ernmental official is able to trespass onto the
curtilage by using technology not within gen-
eral public use.286 ISPs and Internet advertisers
have the ability to extract and analyze metadata;
however, the general public does not use these
technologies.287
In addition to the trespass in viewing the
contents of a computer, there is a popular ex-
pectation of privacy in metadata held within a
computer.288 There is a difference between what
people think is anonymous and private online
and what people think ought to be private.8 9
People expect, and are often willing, to reveal
information to ISPs that they want to keep pri-
vate from the government or other individu-
als.2 90 But this willingness does not dispel a per-
son's reasonable expectation of privacy results
under the Katz analysis since that information
is not being exposed to the public, but is being
J., concurring) (stating the trespassory test is the "irre-
ducible constitutional minimum.").
286 Kllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001). See alo
Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1419 (2013) (Kagan,
J., concurring) (stating that a drug detecting dog was a
device not in general public use when used to explore
within the curtilage of the home).
287 For example, Google requires vast amounts of com-
puter memory to process their data. See Dean, supra
note 116. This processing can require large physical
spaces. See supra note 96. In comparison, thermal imag-
ing cameras, which the Court in Kyllo determined were
not in general public use, are now conmercially avail-
able at less than $300. Daniel Terdiman, Heat Seeker:
Meet the Thermal-Imaging Camera You Can Afford, Cnet,
(Sept. 25, 2014, 9:00 AM), http://ww.cnet.com/news/
heat- seaker-thermal-imaging- canera-for-the-masses/
(stating that, for example, Google requires vast amounts
of computer memory to process their data); See Dean,
supra note 116 (noting that this processing can require
large physical spaces); See supra note 96 (holding ther-
mal imaging cameras, which the Court in Kyllo deter-
mined were not in general public use, are now commer-
cially available at less than $300).
288 See supra notes 135-138 and text accompanying.
289 Raine, et. al., supra note 135.
290 Sylvain, supra note 23, at 492.
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shared with automated machines."' Further-
more, several popular Internet services make
explicit in their terms of service that a user's
metadata will remain anonymous or aggregated
if accessed by a third party.29 2
3. Container Law and Smartphones
Even when a computer is not held with-
in the curtilage, such as a smartphone, it still
receives the same high level of Fourth Amend-
ment protection that an opaque container
would.293 Opaque containers are free from un-
reasonable governmental searches.294 The phys-
ical viewing of the data on a person's smart-
phone by a police officer without a warrant or
probable cause is already unconstitutional.295
The viewing of metadata without a warrant
would also be similarly unconstitutional since
metadata can reveal many of the same priva-
cies of life that content data can.296 For example,
metadata can reveal whom the person emails,297
the number of times and the durations of time
291 Tokson, supra note 104, at 632-36.
292 See, e.g., Google Privacy Policy, supra note 120 (stating
Google "may share aggregated, non-personally identifi-
able information publicly and with our partners - like
publishers, advertisers or connected sites."); Netflix Pri-
vacyPolicy, supra note 16. (stating Netflix "may provide
analysis of and information from or about our users in
the aggregate or otherwise in anonymous form to part-
ners, Service Providers and other third parties.").
" Riley v. Calfornia, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2489 (2014) (the
amount of information a person carries in their phone
is similar to having to "drag[ging] behind them a trunk
of the sort held to require a warrant in Chadwick") (cit-
mg United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 (1977)).
Robbins v. Calfornia, 453 U.S. 420, 427 (1981) (plu-
rality opinion) ("[U]nless the container is such that its
contents may be said to be in plain view, those contents
are fully protected by the Fourth Amendment.").
295 Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2495.
296 See Richards, supra note 257, at 417 (noting that
aggregated metadata can reveal personal information).
29' E.g., United States v. Warshak, 631 E3d 266, 282 (6th
Cir. 2010) (en banc).
spent on websites,298 and the person's actual lo-
cation.299
Viewing metadata of a smartphone is
also a nonvisual inspection of a container in an
"exploratory manner."3" Just like an officer who
squeezes a bag to inspect its contents, inspect-
ing the metadata of a smartphone reveals the
contents of that smartphone without actually
opening the phone and visually inspecting it.30 1
Metadata, by its definition, reveals information
about the data contained in the computer.30 2
Since the content stored on the smartphone is
protected,o3 all information about that content
should be similarly protected.o4
Even when the metadata is stored in an
external source such as a computer server, the
metadata is the contents of the smartphone that
the person is keeping out of public view.0 5 Sim-
ilar to using telephony metadata without a war-
rant to track a person's whereabouts, viewing
the metadata of a person's smartphone tracks
a person's use of their phone and converts a
seemingly private event into a public one.3 "
Similar to computers held within the home or
briefcases carried on the person, smartphones
298 Contra United States v. Perrine, 518 E3d 1196, 1199
(10th Cir. 2008).
2' See, e.g., Google Privacy Policy, supra note 120 ("When
you use a location-enabled Google service, we may col-
lect and process information about your actual location.
We use various technologies to determine location, IP
address, GPS, and other sensors.. . "). See also United
States v. Davis, 754 3d 1205 (11th Cir. 2014) (holding
that obtaining a customer's location using metadata
obtained via court order is unconstitutional).
3oo See Bond v. United States, 529 U.S. 334 (2000).
30 See id.
302 See supra note 126.
03 Riley o. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014).
0 See Tokson, supra note 133, at 2170-71 (metadata that
reveals the underlying content of Internet conmumca-
tions should be treated as the same as content).
' See Brenner, supra note 251, at 257-59.
306 See Davis, 754 E3d at 1216.
28 Washington College of Law Spring 2016
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should be treated as containers.s0 Conceptu-
alizing both smartphones and computers will
simplify the protections the Fourth Amend-
ment provides.
C. Benefits of Container Framework
The benefits of using a presented ana-
lytic framework is two-fold. First, it gives clear
Fourth Amendment protections for metadata
in current technologies.as Second, it provides a
clear framework to analyze Fourth Amendment
protections of future technologies.3 *
1. Current Technologies
With container law guiding the Fourth
Amendment protections of computers and
phones, it simplifies the analysis for what meta-
data is protected under the Fourth Amend-
ment. Treating computers as containers shifts
the focus away from whether there is a rea-
sonable expectation of privacy in evolving dig-
ital technologies, which many judges struggle
with.1 o By treating computers as containers,
judges can begin to conceptualize warrantless
viewing metadata as a trespass, either by using
technology not in public use to look into a per-
son's curtilage or by viewing the contents of a
personal computer in an exploratory manner."n
By treating viewing metadata as a trespass, it
creates the default rule that there is a reason-
able expectation of privacy in a person's meta-
data.312
'0' See supra Subsection IVB.3.
308 See infra Subsection IV.C.1.
" See infra Subsection IV.C.2.
310 See Crowther, supra note 140, at 356-57.
311 See supra Subsections IVB.2-IVB.3.
312 See United States o. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 952 (2012)
("The Katz reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test has
added to, not substituted for, the common-law trespassory
test.").
Additionally, analyzing computers as
containers avoids difficulties with the third-par-
ty doctrine. Courts and scholars have suggested
several ways around the third-party doctrine in
looking at digital privacy."' By treating comput-
ers as containers, metadata gathered by ISPs
and stored on servers is not treated as being
revealed to a third party, but as being stored
on the server under a contractual arrangement,
analogous to a rented storage unit." These
contracts can then alter a person's reasonable
expectation of privacy. 15
Because the metadata is being stored by
a private party, the user's reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy in metadata can be altered pri-
marily based on the privacy agreements be-
tween the Internet user and the ISP.316 Because
servers are automated machines, the metadata
would be presumed to be protected as being
reasonably private. If the server's privacy
agreement states that a user's metadata will
be held anonymously or will be shared only
in aggregated form,1 8 such as Google's Privacy
313 See, e.g., United States v. Warshak, 631 E3d 266,
286-87 (6th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (referring to ISPs as
"intermediaries" and distinguishing them from the
third-party doctrine); United States v. Graham, 796 E3d
332, 353 (4th Cir. 2015) (stating that cell phone users
do not "convey" their metadata to their service provid-
er). See also, Brenner, supra note 251, at 266-68 (stating
that transaction metadata is protected because of the
"shared privacy" interest between users and ISPs).
31 See generally, Bellia & Freiwald, supra note 219.
315 Compare Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2495
(2014) (protecting content stored using a cell phone),
with City of Ontario, Caifornia v. Quon, 560 U.S. 746,
764-65 (2010) (not protecting content of text messages
because of an employment contract for using the cell
phone). See also Terms of Service, Didn't Read, https://
tosdr.org/ (summarizing terms of service for several
popular Internet sites).
316 See Crowther, supra note 140, at 353-55 (noting that
terms of agreement alter a user's reasonable expectation
of privacy).
3 See Tokson, supra note 104, at 638.
318 See supra note 121 for examples.
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Policy,"' then that metadata will be reasonably
considered private, and thus protected from
unreasonable searches. Conversely, if the ISP's
terms of use make clear that the metadata is not
private, there would be no reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy.
This analytic framework is different than
the ones currently being employed by circuit
courts20 because it recognizes the realities of
how privacy on the Internet works.321 The anal-
ysis, like the first category of courts, would find
Fourth Amendment protections for contents
stored communications.2 2 The analysis differs
from the first category because it acknowledg-
es that there is more than a privacy interest in
e-mail contents and in cell phone location, but
that the warrantless viewing of metadata is ac-
tually a trespass by viewing inside the person's
computer or phone.3 23
The analysis differs from the second
category of circuit courts3 24 by not using ten-
uous analogies of treating computer servers as
persons or pen registers under the third-party
doctrine.3 25 It instead treats metadata as stored
within a container that the ISP and the user
have a shared interest in because they have a
contractual agreement akin to rental storage.326
The analysis recognizes that the government
3"9 Google PrivacyPolicy, supra note 120.
320 Supra Section II.A.
321 See Crowther, supra note 142, at 357 ("judges' tech-
nological inexperience and misunderstandings threaten
to further undermine digital privacy interests.").
322 See United States v. Warshak, 631 E3d 266, 288 (6th
Cir. 2010) (en bane) (finding SCA 2703(d) unconstitu-
tional in the context of e-mails); United States v. Davis,
754 E3d 1205, 1217 (finding SCA 2703(d) unconstitu-
tional in the context of cell phone location information).
323 Supra Subsection TV1B.2-TVB.3.
324 Sapra Section II.B.
325 See Kerr, sapra note 38, at 875-76 ("Judges struggle to
understand even the basic facts of [digital] technologies,
and often must rely on the crutch of questionable meta-
phors to aid their comprehension.").
12 Sapra Subsection V.B.1.
cannot view inside this container using tech-
nology not in general public use or view inside
in any exploratory manner without a showing
the search is reasonable."
Finally, the analysis differs from the
third category of courts32 8 by avoiding difficult
questions as to what metadata is content and
what is not.321 The analysis treats all metadata
as content since metadata is contained within
a computer just like any other content that is
protected."' Fourth Amendment protections
would not be based on magistrate discretion,
but would apply to metadata that the ISP and
the user have agreed is private."' In addition
to having implications on Fourth Amendment
protection for current technologies, the same
rationales can apply to future technologies.
2. Future Technologies
While it is difficult to predict how future
technologies will affect the reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy, it is clear that computers and the
Internet will play a crucial role in determining
privacy expectation.33 2 With technology rapid-
ly changing, a clear line of analysis for reason-
able expectations of privacy will be needed."
Scholars have articulated a need for legislative
initiative in clearly defining privacy interests
in technologies." Additionally, as Justice So-
tomayor has noted, "A legislative body is well
situated to gauge changing public attitudes, to
327 Supra Subsections V.B.1-2.
328 Supra Section II.C.
329 See Kerr, supra note 179, at 1029-30.
330 Supra Section IVB.
331 Id.
332 See generally, Sylvain, supra note 23.
333 Id
334 Id at 514-519; Kerr, supra note 38, at 875 ("The task
of generating balanced and nuanced rules requires a
comprehensive understanding of technological facts.
Legislatures are well-equipped to develop such under-
standings; courts generally are not.").
30 Washington College of Law Spring 2016
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draw detailed lines, and to balance privacy and
public safety in a comprehensive way.""' While
a legislative scheme is preferable, if the legis-
lature is unwilling or incapable of keeping up
with technological changes, treating computers
as containers will provide a useful base to ana-
lyze future technologies.
In addition, applying Fourth Amend-
ment protections of containers to new technol-
ogies will have practical benefits. By treating a
user's metadata as shared by user and the ISP,
it will discourage users from hiding or elimi-
nating their metadata in order to feel anony-
mous online. 6 While it is currently difficult to
use the Internet without creating metadata,s'
future technologies may make anonymous In-
ternet use practical."' Avoiding anonymous use
on the Internet has a two-fold advantage.
First, accumulating, aggregating, and
selling metadata is how many successful In-
ternet companies operate."9 By recognizing
metadata as being private content within a us-
er's computer, users could be more willing to
accumulate metadata and share it with ISPs.340
The sharing of metadata will help improve
the economy by improving the online market-
"' United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 964 (2012) (Soto-
mayor, J., concurring).
33. See Rosen, supra note 124, at 196-224 (arguing the
importance of anonymity online); Raine et al., supra
note 135 (Forty-one percent of Internet users already
take steps to disable or remove cookies from their com-
puter).
31 Id. (Fifty-nine percent of Americans do not believe it
is possible to be completely anonymous online); Mozil-
la, supra note 125 (stating it is possible to access the In-
ternet without accumulating metadata, however it then
becomes difficult to use many Internet services, such as
e-mail).
' See Rosen, supra note 124, at 173-78.
3' See supra notes 22-23.
340 See Raine et. al., supra note 135 (Five percent of
Internet users who take steps to hide metadata do so to
hide it from the government).
place."' When users have a privacy interest in
their metadata, they will they be more willing
to share more of their metadata.342
Second, if persons do not accumulate
metadata, the information it reveals could not
be viewed by the government in the event it is
the product of a reasonable search.34 ' The gov-
ernment will not be able to view the metadata
because it simply would not exist.4 4 Similar to
how persons maintain incriminating material
within their property,"' treating metadata as
contained within a personal computer will lead
persons to accumulate metadata that could be
useful to prosecute them. Treating metadata as
something exposed to the public would lead
criminals to be more protective of their meta-
data and destroy useful evidence.
D. Shortcomings of Analytical Framework
Treating metadata as contained within a
computer does not address the issue of con-
tents that are shared with other individuals
using the Internet.4 1 For example, using con-
tainer law would not address the reasonable
expectation of privacy for contents stored using
" See Even, supra note 149 (stating that the market for
analyzing metadata is expected to grow to $16.9 billion
in 2015).
342 See Rosen, supra note 124, at 198-200.
See, e.g., United States v. Lifshitz, 369 E3d 173, 193
(7th Cir. 2004) (searching the defendant's computer
without a warrant was reasonable since the defendant
was on probation and part of the agreement was to
allow monitoring).
311 Rosen, supra note 124, 174 (one encryption service
"destroys all documents and logs on its central server
within twenty-four hours, to avoid subpoenas.").
3 See, e.g., Calfornia v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 209 (1986)
(defendant kept marijuana plants in his house).
34 See Kerr, supra note 192, at 1029-3 1. (arguing that
there exists Fourth Amendment protections for content
on the Internet but they can be waived if shared publi-
cally).
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"cloud computing"4 1 or using peer-to-peer file
sharing. 4 The third-party doctrine would have
more of an impact on shared content than on
metadata.4 1 However, content could still be pro-
tected under a similar framework if the server
that the content is on maintains a clear privacy
policy as to who may view the content.s10
Additionally, the analytical framework
may become unworkable if technology that is
used to access and analyze metadata becomes
in general public use or if people no longer
believe things done on the Internet should be
private. As technology changes, the reasonable
expectation of privacy using technology will
likely change as well." 1 This change could lead
to inconsistent rulings similar to those cur-
rently splitting lower courts.352 However, this
" Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2491 (2014).
('Cloud computing" is the capacity of Internet-connect-
ed devices to "display data stored on remote servers
rather than on the device itself"). See id at 2494-95.
(Content on a cell phone that is stored in the cloud
already has Fourth Amendment protection). See abo,
Kerr, supra note 179, at 1029 ("The Fourth Amendment
should generally protect the contents of communica-
tions stored in 'the cloud' of the Internet, including re-
motely stored files maintained on a server that is hosted
for individual users.").
34 Metro- Coldwyn-Mayer Inc. v Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S.
913, 919 (2005). ("Peer-to-peer file sharing" is software
that allows computer users to share electronic files
"because users' computers communicate directly with
each other, not through central servers."). See also, Unit-
edStates v. Perrine, 518 F3d 1196, 1205 (10th Cir. 2008)
(peer-to-peer sofbvare lowers a person's reasonable
expectation of privacy in metadata).
w See, e.g., United States v. King, 509 F3d 1338, 1341-
42 (11th Cir. 2007) (holding there was no reasonable
expectation of privacy in content shared over an open
computer network).
350 See supra Section IVB.
351 Crowther, supra note 140 at 368.
352 Supra Part II.
inconsistency is more a product of the varying
applications of the third-party doctrine and the
reasonable expectation of privacy test."' Using
container law as a guide simplifies the courts'
analysis of whether there is a reasonable expec-
tation of privacy by using well-established con-
cepts of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.3 4
CONCLUSION
The Internet started out as computer
protocols and has evolved into an entire dig-
ital world.55 It has revolutionized the world
and altered American's concepts of privacy.5 1
Courts have the problem of reflecting these
changing concepts of privacy when they apply
Fourth Amendment protections to metadata."
By treating computers as containers under the
Fourth Amendment and the metadata as con-
tent contained within those containers, a sim-
plified analysis can be used to establish Fourth
Amendment protections for metadata.5
A computer may be just a box, but the
contents of that box are often very private. In
order to protect those intimate contents, all
contents have to be protected equally. Expos-
ing a person's metadata may turn their com-
puter into a Pandora's box and reveal all their
secrets, to terrifying effect.
1 Sapra Part III.
3M Supra Subpart IVB.
35 Leiner, supra note 4.
356 Sylvain, supra note 23, at 489-92.
15 Supra Part III.
358 Supra Part WI
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